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Financial system’s health is a signal of economic growth therefore it is a key indicator to 
investors. As a consequence, one of the main purposes of policymakers is to keep its 
stability as well as protect it from foreign activity. Both financial and economic activity in 
general are susceptible of crises, as soon as this happen a country may face default risk, 
which can be measured with long term debt risk rating of countries. Through this variable 
we propose the use the survival analysis methodology, to analyze falls rating duration and 
capability of macroeconomic variables to predict that event. From the analysis, we point 
out important differences between developed and emerging economies, with variables 




La dinámica del sistema financiero es una señal de crecimiento económico, por lo tanto es 
un indicador clave para los inversionistas. Por lo tanto, uno de los principales retos de la 
política económica es mantener la estabilidad así como proteger el sistema financiero de 
los fenómenos externos. La actividad financiera y la actividad económica son en general 
susceptibles a las crisis y dicho riesgo puede medirse a partir de la calificación de deuda 
de largo plazo. A través de esta variable proponemos aplicar el análisis de sobrevivencia, 
para explorar la duración de las caídas en la calificación de riesgo y la capacidad de 
variables macroeconómicas para predecirlas. Con ello se encontraron diferencias 
importantes en las economías desarrolladas y emergentes, teniendo en cuenta variables de 
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As the world globalizes, financial stability is one of the main concerns all over the 
world. Moreover, if one takes into account both financial system’s vulnerability to 
foreign markets and its stability are a signal to investors, therefore bad behavior of the 
system do not contribute to economic growth. A key indicator of the domestic capital 
market’s health is the credit rating given to the long term debt, which gives information 
of short term macroeconomic stability and payment capability at long term. Indeed, as 
Ratha (2008) states “sovereign risk ratings from agencies such as Fitch, Moody’s, and 
Standard and Poor’s affect capital flows to developing countries through international 
bond, loan and equity markets. Sovereign rating also acts as a ceiling for the foreign 
currency rating of sub-sovereign borrowers”. 
 
Because of what was pointed out above, the present paper presents an approximation to 
financial crises through sovereign risk ratings. Our analysis presents two important 
aspects in rating falls, which were not considered before in this kind of analysis: 
country’s effect and falls timing; to attain these points we propose the use of a survival 
model. This paper uses this methodology to compute the risk function of a fall rating 
controlling by macroeconomics and exchange monthly variables which reflect 
economics’ health at short and mid term for 78 countries between 1995 and 2001
1. We 
exclude from the analysis variables from the real sector as they may be endogenous with 
country risk rating.  
 
Authors who analyses sovereign ratings (Haque et al.: 1998, Reinhart, 2001, 2002) 
focus on its determinants. This study offers a step forward by analyzing determinants in 
time with a survival model, which was not used before in this kind of studies. This 
methodology also allows us to forecast crisis duration and contagion by geographic and 
economic regions. In the study we use a semiparametric methodology, which is better in 
the analysis of non-monotonic risk functions given the persistence and contagion effect.  
                                                 
1 This period in which there were a world crisis, sovereign ratings changed as economic country 
conditions changed, these facts allows us the use of survival analysis    3
 
The paper is divided into six sections, the first is this introduction; the second is a short 
reference to some hypothesis and theory about financial crises; the third one 
summarizes the methodology; the fourth section presents the nonparametric survival 





As Eichengreen (1999) emphasizes, financial crisis are not new; the difference is their 
violence and the damage they do. According with its time, connoisseurs catalog crisis in 
three generations. 
 
The first generation model, which was used to explain crises in the early 1980s, were 
based on the macroeconomic imbalances. To support this point, Krugman (1979) uses a 
simple model to show how attempts to defend a fixed exchange rate can collapse in the 
face of a speculative attack. He shows how the persistence balance of payments deficits
2 
can push a run on the authorities’ stock of international reserves and destroy their 
capacity to defend the exchange rate by sticking up the ability to intervene in the 
foreign-exchange market. The central point of this generation studies is to demonstrate 
how an attack collapsing the exchange rate can occur before reserves would have been 
exhausted otherwise and to pin down its timing. As the point here is that government 
exhausted the reserves and they cannot replenish them by borrowing abroad, the leading 
indicators of this generation of crisis are budget deficits, excessive rates of growth of 
money supply and dwindling reserves. Countries that are susceptible to speculative 
attacks may also exhibit excessive inflation, real exchange rate overvaluated and rising 
interest rates.  
 
With the crisis of the early 1990s, the above symptoms were questioned, because not all 
the countries that succumbed, displayed large fiscal and current account deficits. In 
addition, as control to capitals were lifted and international markets growed, it was less 
possible to assume that central banks could not borrow abroad to replenish their 
                                                 
2 Krugman assumed that payments imbalances and the currency crisis resulted from the tendency of 
governments to run expansionary monetary and fiscal policies, which are financed by printing money.    4
reserves. Obstfeld (1997) and Ozkan and Sutherland (1998) add the assumption that 
governments balance the benefits of continuing to defend the currency through tight 
monetary policies and high interest rates. Under these assumptions, authorities enhance 
their commitment to defend the currency and to maintain price stability, but the impact 
of high interest rates on the economy and the financial system are so high. Although 
there are no restrictions to capital, in these second generation models the level of 
reserves and the ability to get money abroad play no role in calculations. The issue here 
is the role played by interest rates to defend currency and therefore, its impact on 
depressing demand on the default of bank borrowers and on a large short term debt. The 
decision of defending the currency came up from an economic and political self-
interest. Actually, by observing ninety-one countries over the period 1960-1996, 
Gourinchas et al. (2001) found that probability of a bank of exchange crisis increases 
once the country decides to adopt liberalization as a policy. They notice this may be due 
to an absence of regulation or to partial liberalizations based on exchange measures and 
not on monetary policies. Reinhart (2001) revalues liberalization notion by standing out 
the need of protect domestic finances from capital flows fluctuations. Thus, in second 
generation models the crisis depends on subtler unmeasured conditions such as the 
strength of the banking system, or labor market flexibility, or the prospects of economic 
growth and domestic political support to the government and its policies. In fact Calvo 
and Reinhart (1996) prove that contagion mechanism is related with a fixed exchange 
rate and high interest rates, and contrary of what may be thought its impact is the same 
whether small or big countries. Indeed contagion effect occurs easier at a regional level 
than in a global one, meaning affected countries not only belong to a specific 
geographical region but also to a specific group.  
 
Finally, the main differences between first and second generation models is that in the 
latter the speculative attack can precipitate a devaluation that would not have occurred 
in its absence; and that capital controls can bend the balance between the collapse of the 
currency peg and its maintenance forever
3. Therefore an attack that would have neither 
occurred nor succeeded in the presence of capital controls may do both in their absence. 
 
                                                 
3 As in the absence of capital control restrictions, domestic interest rates equal foreign interest rate plus 
the expected rate of depreciation.   5
The crisis of the late 1990s came up with the third generation models. Based on the 
facts observed in Asia, where there were combined issues from the first and second 
generation models, connoisseurs pointed out that those models have something that was 
missing. Additionally, by using data from more than seventy countries during 1960- 
2000, Loaiza and Ranciere (2005) states that economic growth might be negative if the 
country faces a weak financial system in a maturation process due to moral hazard and 
incentive problems. Because of these new conclusions, connoisseurs proposed the third 
generation models which were called crony capitalism and implicit guarantees. 
Basically it was a moral hazard problem in which owners of banks and industrial 
conglomerates on one side, and political leaders on the other, develop ties of mutual 
dependence which left governments loath to let banks fail (Dooley: 1997 and Krugman: 
1998 in Eichengreen: 1999). Once the capital account of the balance of payments was 
opened, the implicit guarantees provided by government to banks were a lure to foreign 
investors and with governments guaranteeing banks against failure, the specter of losses 
was removed therefore, foreign capital flooded the economy and banking system. 
Mackinnon and Pill (1997) argue that once this happened foreign borrowing was so 
excessive and funds were so poorly allocated that capital inflow may reduce the growth 
rates of the countries involved. Therefore the initial capital outflow with the problem 
that governments’ guarantees can be provided only once, therefore, the relationship 
between bankers and politicians’ guarantees provoked a populist backlash that brought 
the crony capitalism. As the authorities leapt to the rescue of the banking system, 
pumping in additional domestic credit, they were forced to disregard the constraints on 
liquidity implied by the commitment to peg the exchange rate. 
 
Finally there are some authors who have focused in studying all three generations 
models by using whether a subjective definition of crisis (Manasse et. al.: 2003) or by 
seeing the correlation between credit ratings and crisis episodes (Reinhart: 2002) 
especially in Asia and Argentina. On a first sight both perspectives use macroeconomics 
and political variables to check the influence on the dependent variable (crisis or credit 
rating). On the other hand the authors who use ratings found not only an amazing 
correlation between the credit rating and sovereign default but they also found that the 
key determinants of ratings are macroeconomic variables meanwhile political variables 
have a marginal effect (Haque et. al.: 1998, Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, 2005). In addition,   6
they found a pattern in country crises by pointing out that for most of the sample they 







Probability models have been the most used methodology to study the determinants of 
change. Later studies point out that the analysis allows the advance in mathematical and 
statistical tools. 
 
The first empirical studies reckoned the probability of leaving the current state by 
explaining the individual characteristics at a specific moment based on binary models
4 
in which the probability of maintaining the current state or changing. Thought, this 
method is a static approximation which does not capture nor temporality or deviation 
from circumstances which may affect the conditional probability of change. Therefore, 
by using this methodology it is not possible to answer questions such as: is there any 
point in time in which the chance of change is higher? or which is the probability of 
change the state given that the agent has been active until the present period? 
 
Survival models are not only focused on the occurrence of the event, but also on the 
impact of predictable variables (constant or changing in time)
5 on the chance of change 
the state. The dynamic method which takes account time and individual characteristics 
depend on elements which are seen by traditional literature as specification errors, 
which do not allow an efficient estimation and, therefore, probabilities may be 
underestimated or overestimated. These elements may be summarized as: censoring, 
continuous or discrete treatment, ties and multiple causes of ending.  
•  Censoring: an observation is censored when it does not change in the analyzed 
period. Based on this fact one may define three types of censoring which are 
presented in Figure 1, the first (t1) makes reference to those observations which 
                                                 
4 In these models, the values of the dependent variable are 0 and it follows a particular distribution, the 
most commonly used are the logistic and the normal standard distributions    
5 The inclusion of changing variables may cause simultaneity or autocorrelation.   7
start the active state before the recollection period (left censoring), the second 
type (t2) is the one in which once the analyzed period has ended the variables 
have not changed their state (right censoring), and the third type (t3) joints left 
and right censoring. Finally, in t4 there is no censoring. To solve the censoring 
problems, survival models allow take apart the probability analysis of being 
active and the probability of instant change.   
•  Continuous and discrete treatment: although, survival analysis may consider 
high frequency variables (i.e. diary) and then variable may be continuous, there 
are events in which the timing is so long like academic periods in college, 
where it is easy see that the duration variable has a discrete behavior given that 
the event occurs at the same frequency. With this type of data, the duration 
analysis must include corrections on the bias of probability.   
•  Ties: given the problem of discrete and continuous treatment, when there is a 
variable with high time intervals, it may occur that many individuals change in 
the same period, even though the ending of the event might be at different 
moments. Based on this issue, survival models allow assumptions over the 
whole information faced by individuals with repeated duration or the correction 
of the possible bias in the estimation of probabilities.   
Figure 1. Censoring types 
 
     Source: Kiefer (1988) 
•  Multiple causes of ending: even though the reasons of change may be identified 
the impact may be different over individuals. Survival models which allow these 
distinctions are known as competing risk models. 
As the advantages of survival models were shown above, it is worthwhile present basic 
concepts:    8
The first remark must be made on the dependent variable; the duration variable must be 
a random nonegative variable, thus it may be represented by density function  ) (t f and 
by a cumulative distribution function ( ) t T P t F ≤ = ) ( . The first function is related to the 
duration of the event and the second is related to the maximum duration. 
Based on the functions mentioned above, one constructs the survival and the risk 
functions. The first function captures the probability that an individual lasts more than a 
specific time, which may be assessed by the survival function ( )( ) t T P t F t S ≥ = − = ) ( 1 . 
The risk or hazard function, represents the instant probability of change, it means it 
considers the duration between the active stage and when it ends, and this may be 
represented as () () () ( )
() t S
t f
t T t f t T t t T t P t h = ≥ = ≥ ∆ + < ≤ = . 
The purpose of survival models is to assess  ( ) t S  and  ( ) t h  based on the observed 
individual characteristics, to achieve it there are two kinds of survival methodologies: 
parametric and nonparametric estimations. To obtain ( ) t S , the methodology used is the 
proposed by Kaplan and Meier (1958), which is based on the nonparametric estimators 
























t t if 1
t S ˆ  
Where t is the period in which the first change occurs,  i y  is the sum of individuals who 
may change of state at moment  i t  and  i d  is the number of individuals who change at 
moment i t . 
Based on the survival function, one may get the cumulative risk function  () t Λ  meaning 
the cumulative risk at specific moment; this is known as the Nelson-Aalen estimator, 


















t t if 0
t ˆ    9
With () t Λ ˆ , one gets the instant probability of change; this is a raw nonparametric 
estimator of the risk function; given by: 
() () ( ) 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ − Λ − Λ = Λ ∆ t t t  
An estimation of the smooth risk function may be made by a kernel approximation 
of () t Λ ∆ˆ . Risk function may be achieved by using, either parametric or semiparametric 
estimators: the first estimators are based on the assumption that duration depends on a 
monotonous way from the probability of change with weibull, exponencial or gompertz 
distributions. The latest group estimators assumes that relation between survival and 
probability may has a nonmonotonic form, which is an advantage, not only because this 
more general but also because estimators are more efficient. 
As in the present paper we use semiparametric estimators, we focus on some 
specifications on them. The pioneer model is the one proposed by Cox (1972); this 
assumes that risk function has a multiplicative form which allows split time effect and 
the probability (baseline hazard) which captures the common risk of individuals at 
specific time and the effect that depends on individual characteristics which is defined 
by a nonnegative function, by simplicity one assumes this function as an indicator 
exponential function, which is a lineal combination of individual characteristics. Then 
the Cox model can be summarizing in the function
6: 
() ()
β i e t h t h i
x x
′ = 0  
Where  () t h0  is the common risk function or baseline and 
β i e
x′  is the function which 
points out individual characteristics´ effect on probability of change.  
DATA AND NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION 
The paper analyzes information of 78 countries between 1995 and 2001. Because of 
asymptotic properties of the models we use and the frequency of independent variables 
data frequency is monthly. The countries chosen were those which have sovereign risk 
rating during the studied period. The sample is representative among countries with 
                                                 
6 One of the advantages of this approximation to the risk function is that it accomplishes the independence 
irrelevant alternative assumption, because risk relative function risk depends only on the individual 
characteristics.   10
capital markets more or less developed. Ratings are classified by region and by OECD 
members, as can be seen in Figure 2: 
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The variable we use to assess risk country is the rating given by the agency Moody to 
long term bond in foreign currency. The ratings go up from Aaa to C, with numeric 
variations from 1 to 3 and; + or – signs if the changes were minimal. By observing data 
ratings, we notice that meanwhile ratings higher or equal to Baa3 belong to investment 
scale and, lower or equal ratings to Ba1 are in speculation scale. In the analysis every 
fall rating is a default. In the analyzed period there were 72 ratings fall, the region with 
more failures is Asia Pacific, followed by America and Europe. Although African 
countries ratings do not fall, they confer information to survival function; therefore 
African information must be included. Figure 3 presents failure distribution by OECD 
country and region. 
 
In contrast to other risk indicators, country risk rating from the agency Moody’s not 
only takes account economic variables in a pure sense but also considers long term 
issues. Although literature does not make difference between crisis and country’s 
decline, we must call attention to one point: we define default as any fall rating. By 
doing this we avoid subjective definitions of crisis like those proposed by Domaç and 
Martinez (2000) and Gourinchas et al. (2001) and we make use of the above mentioned 
ratings’ characteristics.    11
 
In the analysis every fall rating is a default. In the analyzed period there were 72 ratings 
fall, the region with more failures is Asia Pacific, followed by America and Europe.  
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As in the analysis there are countries with repeated events of ratings falling, then it is 
convenient verify the average of number of failures, which in turns may be used to bear 
out country risk intense and persistence on long term debt. These results may be seen in 
Figure 4, where there is evidence that in America and Asia-Oceania, the average of 
failures duplicates the number of Europe and the total average, this may be due to the 
number of OECD members in the first two regions. 








Africa  America Asia Oceanía  Europa  Total general
NO OECD OECD Total 
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Failures distribution is accumulated in between 1998 and 1999 with a highest number of 
9 ratings failures in September of 1998 and 6 failures in July. As around these dates 
there is an accumulation of failures, this means there may be a persistence effect (or a 
contagion one). On the other side, there were no dramatic changes until 1997 but there 
were an outlier in 2001. Both, these results and failure cumulative function are shown in 
Figure 5.  
Figure 5. Failure rating distribution over time 
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As was shown in the previous section, survival analysis requests both survival and risk 
function estimation. Therefore, Kaplan-Meier survival function and a smooth hazard 
function were estimated through the Kernel of epanechnikov function; these was made 
with the group of 78 countries (Figure 6), with the OECD countries (Figure 7) and with 
the countries jointed by region. 
Figure 6. Risk rating survival analysis to 78 countries  
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Risk rating presents two survival critic regions. During the first 18 periods, more than 
30% of all countries fall. The phenomenon is explained by multiple failures and not by 
the crisis observed in the first years of the sample. As was seen earlier, most of the   13
failures were in 1998, and less than 10 failures were before January of 1997. Once a 
country overlaps the first zone, it faces high risk levels between period 30 and 50, which 
is shown in 1998 financial crisis. Some countries which did not fall at the beginning, 
faced troubles in that year; at the same time their probability of a risk rating falling goes 
up after 45 periods. The presence of these countries is especially important if one takes 
account that every subsequent failure of any of these countries bestows information to 
the probabilities close to the origin, even though if the failure is caused by the crisis.   
 
1998 crisis is seen directly in failure probabilities growth around period 45 and; 
obliquely by considering the replies, in the high probabilities between periods 5 and 15. 
An interesting regularity is that the risk function is not monotonous, which suggests that 
the survival model must consider semiparametric structures, this is a result of the 
contagion effect between 1998 and 1999, which earlier and later reduces risk change 
rating. 
Figure 7. Risk rating survival analysis in 78 countries, by OECD classification 
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Once OECD countries are analyzed, it is found that developed countries have a lower 
probability of failing. Even more, apparently 1998 crisis did not caused a huge direct 
effect on the instantaneous probability of reducing risk rating, because most falls 
occurred before 20 periods. This is explained by 6 falls in Japan (40 % of falls in the 
group of countries). Although defaults occurred close to 1998 crisis, not all of them 
were in risk function around period 40, because those were replies. 
 
In regions´ analysis, it was observed that Europe, as a group, has the lowest probability 
of falling followed by America and Asia - Oceania, which have important differences in   14
time probability, being the first region prone to this phenomenon in the first periods. In 
Europe the biggest impact is given also by multiple falls, standing out the cases of 
Moldavia (4 falls) Turkey, Ukraine, Russia (3 falls each one) and Romania (2 falls). The 
opposite case is the one observed in Asia Pacific. Although there were countries such as 
Japan (6 falls), Pakistan (5 falls), Malaysian and Thailand (4 falls each one) whose 
replies contribute to risk function around period 20, many of them were robust at the 
beginning of the period and just few of them had problems in 1998. The probability of 
failure is greater around period 40 which suggests that in this region 1998 crisis played 
a key rol. America’s risk function suggests that there were persistence in some falls, as 
in Argentina (8 falls), Colombia (4 falls), Ecuador and Venezuela (3 falls each one). 
When failure probabilities were estimated, these replies were as important as the direct 
effect of crisis. 
Figure 8. Risk rating survival analysis in 78 countries, by region  





















0 20 40 60 80
analysis time
region = America region = Europa
region = Africa region = Asia-Oceanía











0 10 20 30 40 50
analysis time
region = America region = Europa
region = Asia-Oceanía




Bearing in mind the peculiarities of survival and risk functions presented in the previous 
section, models were estimated following parametric and semiparametric issues in order 
to explain the determinants of countries risk ratings fallings. In the first group there 
were used distributions like Weibull, Gompertz and exponentially; at this point it is vital 
stand out that these models may present bias problems since risk function is not 
monotonous; nevertheless the estimation is based in two reasons: first to have a 
reference to compare the Cox Models results and secondly, the risk function is not 
monotonous but it presents a decreasing tendency. 
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Empirical regularities suggest that financial risk, and therefore its rating, depends on 
exchange and credit risk, as well as on real sector stability and indebtedness level of the 
economy. Hence, the analysis considered five explanatory variables in order to capture 
these interrelations, the variables were: percentage of the quota of International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) loan, exchange regime, OECD participation and the variance and 
growth rate of international reserves. Additionally and with the purpose of captures 
contagion financial risk, we construct an accumulation crisis variable for each region 
and for the entire sample. The expected effect of the above is the following: 
 
•  Percentage of the quota of IFM loan: this variable captures the indebtedness 
state of the countries; the expected effect on risk rating is negative. 
•  Exchange regime: it is measured by a scale variable that represents the level of 
rigidity of the exchange system, in this 1 is the floating regime, 2 is an 
intermediate system and 3 is the fixed regime. The effect of this variable on risk 
rating is not clear, since on one side it is possible to think that a system with a 
floating regime is more exposed to the changes of external sector, which might 
accelerate any contagion effect; nevertheless, under a fixed regime the monetary 
authority must commit itself with reliable measures with the purpose of conserve 
financial system stability by monetary emission or the accumulation of reserves. 
•  OECD participation() OECD : this is a dummy variable which is 1 if it is an 
OECD country member. The variable captures risk differences between 
developed and emerging economies.  
•  Variance of international reserves (ser): it is measured as the standard deviation 
of international reserves with a window of one year earlier and one year later of 
the consolidated observation. This one allows capturing the instability of the 
national finances and exposition to international commerce and to the monetary 
authority activity. The expected effect on risk rating is negative. 
•  Reserves growth rate (rg): it is measured as the annual growth of international 
reserves. The intuition behind the variable is tied to the payment capacity of the 
economy; it means a greater accumulation of reserves is a sign of positive 
macroeconomic behavior; therefore the expected effect is positive. 
•  Crises accumulation (ca): this variable accumulates the number of crises by 
region in time, aiming to verify if probability of rating change of a specific   16
country has an inertial effect on rating change in the closest country(ies). 
Although, one should notice that transmission mechanism may be due to trading 
relations among countries, which in turns, are bigger among nearby countries. 
In order to capture any nonlinear effect of this variable, we use a second degree 
polynom. To avoid correlation between a variable and its square, when the 
model incluyes the later, we use an ortogonal polynom generated by the crisis 
accumulation of each region. 
 
Data is from International Financial Statistics from IMF (2007), excepting by 
exchange rate regime, which is from Reinhart and Rogoff (2002). Before the 
analysis  of colineality among variables was verified, this was not significative as it 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Control variables  matrix correlation 
  % quota  Exchange 




% quota  1.000          
Exchange rate  -0.057 1.000         
OECD  -0.163 0.133 1.000       
S.E(Reserves)  0.039 -0.056 0.200  1.000     
Reserves growth  0.088 -0.035 -0.115  0.069  1.000   
Crises accumulation 0.090 0.077 -0.169  0.063 -0.098  1.000 
 
Then, model is specified by: 
( ) ( )
β i e t h t h i
x x
′ = 0  
rg ser OECD er q i 5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β β + + + + = ′ x  
Results are shown in Table 2; it includes proportional risk models and parametric 
models results, the later is a reference point. The diagnostic analysis is focused 
exclusively on Cox proportional risk model
7. In order to test contagion effect, we 
estimate a model with crises accumulation variable and without OECD variable, 
since the later presents a regional correlation the inclusion of both variables in the 
same exercise give similar information. As it is seen in the Cox column in Table 2, 
the model is robust on the change of regional correlation measure and contagion 
proxy.  
                                                 
7 It is important to emphasize that the coefficients of these models follow the proposed intuitions and they 






Table 2. Parametric and semiparametric survival models results 
Variable Cox(1)8 Cox(2) Cox(3) Cox(4) Weibull Gompertz  Exponential 
0.0013 0.0011  0.0011 0.0012 0.0016 0.0014  0.0018  % quota 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
-0.2931 -0.3474 -0.3388 -0.3107 -0.3013 -0.2637 -0.3294  Exchange rate 
(0.1574) (0.1553) (0.1551) (0.1578) (0.1533) (0.1552) (0.1512) 
-0.8751     -0.8451 -1.0346 -0.9165 -1.0990  OECD 
(0.3379)     (0.3499) (0.3336) (0.3377) (0.3288) 
  0.0320 1.6126 0.7160 -1.0346 -0.9165 -1.0990  Crisis acumulation 
 (0.0151) (1.4201) (1.4627) (0.3336) (0.3377) (0.3288) 
   -2.1936 -2.0769       Crisis acumulation 
(second degree)     (1.0560) (1.0544)      
0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001  0.0001  S.E(Reserves) 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
-2.1698 -2.1605 -2.0294 -2.0433 -2.4257 -2.3156 -2.6208  Reserves growth 
(0.4901) (0.4888) (0.4990) (0.5083) (0.4761) (0.4617) (0.4623) 
      -3.1800 -3.2985 -3.6229  Constant 
      (0.4343) (0.3357) (0.3111) 
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
 
The variable percentage of quota implies that an increase of 1 % in the use of the quota 
of IMF loan increases the probability of rating reduction 0.13 percentage points (pp); by 
looking at exchange rate type the exercise suggests that a more rigid exchange rate 
diminishes this probability in 29.3 pp
9.  
 
OECD participation variable proves that those countries with better economic 
development have a probability of 58.31 pp lower than less developed and emergent 
countries. Considering this important difference, it is possible to think that survival 
functions of OECD countries are different from the others; this observation is supported 
by log rank and wilcoxon test, whose results are presented Table 3 
 
                                                 
8 The test, which is based on Schoenfeld residuals, suggests that hazard proportional assumption is 
reached both at individual and global level; additionally, the Cox models which include control variables 
which change in time suggest that the time effect is not significant. 
9 This variable was also specified as a dummy variable, the result does not change and shows differences 
between floating exchange rate and to other two regimes, but there are no significant differences between 
these.    18
Table 3. Survival function test between OECD countries and the others 
Pruebas Log  Rank  Wilcoxon Cox 
2
1 χ   4.63 3.66 4.87 
p-valor  0.0315 0.0557 0.0274 
 
This result may allow doing a risk analysis for every group; nevertheless, the size of the 
OECD sample is very small, therefore it is possible to think that the coefficient of the 
variable is a good approach to this distinguishing probability. On the other hand 
international reserves instability presents an increase in the probability of falling of 8.6 
pp for every thousand units, and growth rate diminishes probability in 88.5 pp. 
 
In the model which includes crisis accumulation variable (Cox(2) column), the 
coefficients of the variables do not change dramatically. According to what we 
expected, accumulation variable has a positive effect, meaning that the probability of 
fall of a country increases 3.2 pp when neighbors’ ratings fall. 
 
As is seen in the distribution function of contagion variable (Figure 5), one may think it 
has a nonlinear effect
10. In order to capture this effect and to avoid the multicolineality 
raised from the inclusion of variables of higher degree, we include an orthogonal 
polynom of second degree
11. Contagion variable has concave form; this suggests that 
the effect of the variable on probability of falling is higher on lower levels of crises 
accumulated. The observation may be supported on Gourinchas et al. (2001) meaning 
there is a strong correlation between contagion and risk at short term, but it is 
neutralized at mid term.  
 
By including the orthogonal polynom we isolate contagion from the OECD effect, these 
two variables seemed highly correlated. In the model which includes both variables 
(column Cox(4)) contagion variable has positive but decreasing effect, in addition it 
reduces the probability of rating falling in OECD countries (similar to what was 
obtained in the first model). 
 
                                                 
10 Indeed after period 45, there is a strong acceleration in crises 
11 In order to capture a nonlinear effect, we include the square of the variable but it exhibited 
multicolineality problems. In addition we construct an spline based on time and crises accumulation but 
they were not significant, the same result was obtained for orthogonal polynoms of third degree.    19
Survival, risk and cumulative risk functions getting out from Cox model, as well as 
baseline estimations are in the Annex, where it is shown that the model replies the 
regularities observed in the graphic analysis of the previous section which shows 
financial falls persistence, which may be explained by replies in rating falling or region 
contagion effects. 
 
To verify forecast model quality, survival function for OECD classification was 
estimated, both the semiparametric one and the obtained from Cox model (see Figure 
9); by this estimations it is seen clearly that the model presents a good fit. 
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A country’s long term debt risk rating is a key signal of financial system, thus it is a 
signal to investors, too. If the purpose is to keep this risk indicator stable, then, in order 
to reach the goal policy makers may use mechanisms of transmission based on 
monetary and exchange policy. 
 
Literature has studied the impact of real, financial and political variables on risk ratings, 
the results have shown that the second group has the greatest impact; meanwhile 
political variables just have a limited impact (Haque et al., 1998). On the other hand, as   20
real variables are potentially endogenous with the rating, it is not possible to establish a 
clear causality. 
 
Because the space-temporal characteristic of survival models, it is feasible to combine 
idiosyncratic country effects and time effects, which in turn is tied with financial 
contagion. Therefore, in the studied period (1995-2001) which was characterized by a 
great financial instability; through the model we conclude that an excessive 
indebtedness with the IMF, exchange rigidities and international reserves instability 
have a remarkable negative effect on risk ratings. On the other hand, by observing the 
results between OECD and not OECD members and among regions, we found that the 
higher is the GDP of a country the lower is the probability of rating fall, this event is 
highly correlated with contagion effects by region which in turns has important positive 




Bissoondoyal-Bheenick, Emawtee (2005) An analysis of the determinants of sovereign 
ratings. Global Finance Journal (15) 251– 280 
 
Calvo, Sara and Carmen M. Reinhart (1996) Capital flows to Latin America: is there 
evidence of contagion effects. Policy research working paper 1619 
 
Cleves, M., et al. (2004) An introduction to survival analysis using stata. Stata Press. 
 
Domaç, Ilker and Maria Soledad Martinez (2000) Banking Crises and Exchange Rate 
Regimes: Is There a Link? Policy Research Working Papers 2489 
 
Eichengreen, Barry (1999) Toward a new international financial architecture. A 
practical Post-Asia Agenda. Institute for International Economics 
 
 
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, Rodrigo Valdes and Oscar Landerretche (2001) Lending 
booms: Latin america and the World. NBER Working Paper #8249 
 
International Monetary Fund (2007), International Financial Statistics. Database 
 
Haque, Nadeem U., Mark Nelson, and Donald J. Mathieson (1998) The Relative 
Importance of Political and Economic Variables in Creditworthiness Ratings IMF 
Working Paper 98/46 
 
Jenkis, S. P., (1995). Easy Estimation Methods for Discrete-Time Duration Models. 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 57, 129-138. 
   21
___________, (2005). Survival analysis. Institute for Social and Economic Research, 
University of Essex, Colchester. 
 
Kiefer, N. (1988). Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 26, 646-679. 
 
Krugman, Paul (1979) A model of Balance-of-Payments Crisis. Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking 11:311-325 
 
Loayza, Norman and Romain Ranciere (2005) Financial Development, Financial 
Fragility, and Growth. IMF Working Paper 170 
 
 
Mackinnon, R. Huw, P. (1997) Credible Economic liberalization and overborrowing. 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 87: 189-193 
 
Manasse, Paolo, Nouriel Roubini, and Axel Schimmelpfennig (2003) Predicting 
Sovereign Debt Crisis IMF Working Paper, November 03/221 
 
Obstfeld, Maurice (1997) Destabilizing effects of exchange rate escape clauses. Journal 
of International Economics 43:61-77 
 
Ozkan, F. Gulcin and Alan Sutherland (1998) A currency crisis model with an 
optimizing policy maker. Journal of International Economics 44:339-364 
 
Ratha, Dilip (2008) in http://dilipratha.com/countryrisk.htm in January 21st of 2008 
 
Reinhart, C. (2002) Default, Currency Crisis and Sovereign Credit Ratings. NBER 
Working Paper 8738.  
 




Reinhart, C. y Rogoff, K. (2002) The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: a 


















SURVIVAL AND RISK FUNCTIONS 
 


















0 20 40 60 80
analysis time
















































0 10 20 30 40 50
analysis time
Cox proportional hazards regression
 


































































0 20 40 60
_t
  